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This paper aims to construct a framework for 
understanding the causes and dynamics of the wave of 
teacher strikes that took place in 2018-19. To do this, the 
paper first analyzes the constraints under which the state 
managers function and describes the relationship between 
the state and public education. Second, it summarizes a 
theoretical framework for understanding the Great 
Recession and describes the influence of neoliberal policy 
orthodoxy on the reaction to the Great Recession. Third, it 
provides empirical evidence that displays how following 
the Great Recession, the constraints of the state actors and 
implementation of certain policies reduced spending on 
public education which led to a decrease in teachers’ 
salaries. Fourth, it summarizes the history of teacher 
strikes in the 1970s and 2010s and briefly compares these 
two waves. I conclude that unless teachers continue to 
engage in class struggle, neoliberal austerity imposed by 
the state will continue.  
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Introduction 
On February 22nd West Virginia public school teachers went on a wildcat strike 
for raises and maintaining their health benefits.(Elk 2018b) The strike lasted 9 school 
days and ended up with the all school employees winning a 5% raise.(Associated Press 
2018) The victory of West Virginia teachers inspired teachers in states like Oklahoma 
and Arizona. In Oklahoma, the teachers went on strike on April 2nd even though they 
had received a $6,000 raise just days before. They demanded a $10,000 raise and 
more funding for their schools.(Elk 2018a) In Kentucky, teachers called a sickout on 
March 30th then rallied to the state capitol on April 2nd as Kentucky governor vetoed 
a bill that would increase per pupil funding the week before(McLaren and Costello 
2018). He also signed a pension reform bill in February that was widely unpopular 
with the teachers as it made teacher pensions more like 401(k) plans. The wave of 
strikes eventually spread to blue states in Denver, Chicago, Oakland and LA 
(DiMaggio and DeManuelle-Hall 2019). 
In the light of the new wave of teacher strikes, I aim to provide a theoretical 
understanding of the decline in the state of public education and teachers’ work 
standards to explain the current wave of radicalization among teachers. To do this, I 
will attempt to provide a basic theoretical groundwork for understanding the state 
actors, capitalist crises and their relation to the state, as well as the state’s role in 
determining the quality and the quantity of public services. In capitalist economies, 
the state is responsible for a variety of tasks that include providing infrastructure 
individual capitalists cannot develop on their own, legitimizing the existing relations 
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of production and reproducing the capitalist social relations through reinforcing 
property relations. These tasks are performed by various branches of the government, 
and institutions that are run by these branches. Through class struggle, workers can 
influence state policies and increase the state’s influence in the economy. However, 
this rarely happens on the terms of the workers. The expansion of public education 
has been a result of many struggles; but too often, as struggles die out, the gains that 
came through them began to be undermined by dynamics of capital accumulation. 
Class struggle is one of the many factors that influence state policies. But even then, 
the main determinants of state policies remain to be the necessities of maintaining a 
level of capitalist production and the capitalist social order. Only through obstructing 
the reproduction of capitalism can the workers gain concessions from the state.  
In the first section of this paper I will provide an overview of state theory and 
discuss the constraints under which the state actors come up with policies. Second 
section will focus on aggregate profitability as a factor that determines the actions of 
capitalists and state actors alike. It will also discuss the origins of neoliberalism and 
how it shaped the policies that followed the Great Recession. Third section will 
elaborate the influence of structural constraints on the actions of state actors through 
showing empirically which actions or inactions have led to the decline in the quality 
of education and teachers’ pay. It will give an overview of state and financing of 
education, taxation, and spending. Finally, the last section will look at the history of 
teacher strikes and their relationship to the state. I will conclude by summarizing the 
relationship between the state, profitability and teacher strikes in the public sector.  
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The State 
To explain the current crisis in public schools, we need a better understanding 
of the relationship between the state actors and the capitalist class. Historically, the 
state is capitalist due to the nature of its development, but its actions often contradict 
the interests of the capitalist class. There are four major theories of the capitalist 
state that try to explain the contradiction between the state’s capitalist nature and 
pro-worker reforms sometimes pursued by the state in the past.  
First is the ‘instrumentalist’ view which argues that the state is the instrument 
of a class-conscious vanguard of the capitalist class. This view stems from the earlier 
and more polemical works of Marx and was prominent among second and third 
international Marxists (Miliband 1969). In the Communist Manifesto, Marx claims 
“The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common 
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx 1888) Today, even among Marxists this view 
is hard to maintain uncritically, given that the state provides many material benefits 
to the working class today.  
One of the more recent iterations of this view  that aims to grapple with this 
contradiction comes from the scholars of ‘corporate liberalism’  (Skocpol 2016). These 
writers argue that the New Deal was the consequence of a conscious pursuit of long-
term interests among the vanguard of the capitalist class. For this view to hold, 
however, there must be a class-conscious vanguard of the capitalist class, who can 
pursue both the short-term and the long-term interests of the capitalist class. Skocpol 
argues that this was simply not true at the time, as most capitalists were in intense 
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competition with one another (Ibid: 164) The intense and continuous competition 
between capitalists contradicts the main premises of this view.  
The second view is the ‘structural functionalist’ view. Proponents of this view 
argue that state’s objective function is to maintain continuous reproduction of 
capitalism (Poulantzas 1969). Hence, the capitalist class does not need to exert direct 
pressure on the state for the state to pursue pro-capitalist policies. As a result, the 
state has relative autonomy from the capitalist class, which enables it to pursue 
policies that might contradict the short-term interests of an individual capitalist, but 
also enables the reproduction of capitalism in the long run. This account suggests 
that it is not the vanguard of the capitalist class, but the state that is conscious of the 
long-term interests of the capitalist class. Functionalists run into a similar problem 
as the instrumentalists by assuming the state, instead of the vanguard of the 
capitalist class, is conscious of the long-term policies required for capitalist social 
reproduction. In this scenario, however, if individual capitalists become conscious of 
their own long-run interest, and their interests are contradicted by the state policies, 
then the relative autonomy of the state would be very limited since capitalists would 
try to exert direct pressure on the state (Block 1987: 53).  Hence, much like the first 
view the dynamics of competition would overwhelm a coherent unified long-term 
strategy.  
The third view is the ‘state autonomist’ view which proposes that the state has 
complete, or near-complete, autonomy from class relations, and this autonomy 
enables it to shape class relations. The main limitations on the state are those 
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imposed by “national administrative arrangements, governmental institutions, and 
political parties” (Skocpol 2016: 201). The policies are neither determined by 
capitalists, nor by the workers. They are determined by the state managers, whose 
insulated social status enables them to shape the terrain of conflict between workers 
and capitalists. Skocpol, for example argues that it was the legalization of the right 
to collective bargain that caused the mass wave of unionizations in 1933-35. This view 
however undermines the agency of the working class by assuming the working class’s 
relationship to the state is what determines its willingness to engage in class 
struggle.‡ As much as the particularities of state policy are determined by those who 
actually pass the legislation, the horizons of the policies the state managers are 
shaped by the balance of class forces.  
Finally, the fourth view is what I will refer to as the ‘class struggle’ view, which 
is the view that will be explored most in depth as it appears the most applicable for 
the purposes of this paper. The foundations of this view are developed by Fred Block 
in the Ruling Class Does Not Rule (Block 1987). For Block, while capitalists are 
conscious of their (short term) interests, they are not fully conscious of what is 
necessary to reproduce the existing (political and economic) social order. State actors, 
on the other hand, are forced to figure out how to reproduce the existing social order. 
Hence, Block agrees with Poulantzas that the managers of the state have a broader 
understanding of society than the capitalists, but he contends that their 
understanding is still short of a complete knowledge of the necessities of reproducing 
 
‡ See (Goldfield and Melcher 2019) for a critique of state autonomist interpretation of New Deal 
historiography.  
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the existing order. One factor of this lack of understanding on the part of the state 
managers could be their struggle to maintain political power and the distortions this 
causes in their understanding. For example, state actors often must react to 
immediate crises to remain in power but sometimes their reactions might lead to 
bigger crises and disrupt the reproduction of the social order. But if neither the ruling 
class nor its representatives have a complete understanding of the necessities of 
preserving and reproducing capitalist social relations then how does the state manage 
to do just that? Block claims that there are two subsidiary structural mechanisms 
and two major structural mechanisms that force the state actors to act in the general 
interests of the capitalists and preserve capitalist social relations.  
The first subsidiary mechanism is the direct ways by which the bourgeois 
influences the state apparatus. Since we have established that capitalists are at least 
aware of their short-term interests, they are also aware of the impact the state 
apparatus has on those interests. Thus, capitalists act to put pressure on the state, 
in pursuit of their interests, through direct means such as campaign contributions, 
lobbying activities and favors to politicians and civil servants. Oftentimes, capitalists 
will actively participate in private policy making groups that have powerful impact 
on formulation of government policies, although these are likely to diverge from the 
unengaged ruling class opinion. But even in the instances where members of the 
ruling class do not directly engage in these groups, those from other classes fill this 
role as their representatives. An example to this mechanism can be seen in the 
charter school movement, where the likes of Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Chan 
7 
 
Zuckerberg Initiative and the Walton Family have campaigned for privately run 
public schools (Charter School Growth Fund 2017b).  
The second subsidiary mechanism is bourgeois cultural hegemony. Block 
states that there are written and unwritten rules about what constitutes legitimate 
state policy. An example to this could be the neoliberal ideology that has been, and 
still is hegemonic among the ruling class and state actors. Neoliberalism promotes 
austerity, tax cuts and financial deregulation. Neoliberal hegemony provided a 
framework for many states and counties to underfund their public schools as we will 
see in the following sections. Those that oppose the neoliberal consensus on these 
policies have often been marginalized within the state apparatus.  
The first major structural mechanism can be derived from the fact that all state 
actors need to maintain some degree of economic activity to be able to maintain their 
own power regardless of their political ideology. Firstly, because the financing of the 
state apparatus is dependent on its tax revenues and borrowing, both of which depend 
on the state of the economy. And secondly, public support for a regime will decline 
sharply in the instances of high unemployment, low economic activity, and a shortage 
of key goods. Even if public support is not significantly affected, it will make it more 
challenging for state actors to maneuver other challenges and take effective actions.  
The level of economic activity depends on private investment decisions made 
by individual capitalists. Block states that this means that capitalists, as investors, 
can essentially veto state policies since reducing their private investments can cause 
major political crises for state managers. This discourages state managers from 
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pursuing policies that might decrease the rate of investment. In fact, the investment-
veto capitalists hold encourages state managers to pursue policies that would 
increase private investments. This makes it more likely for the state actors to act in 
the interest of capitalists. As we will see later, many states have reduced their tax 
rates to increase private investments following the Great Recession. 
In short, the state needs to maintain a level of ‘business confidence’. Capitalists 
decide on their level of investment based on such economic factors as wages, tax rates, 
market size but also non-economic factors such as the type of government, political 
stability. If capitalists believe that the tax rates are about to increase, they could 
threaten state managers with reducing their rate of investment. Or, if they believe 
that state managers are going to violate fundamental rules of the market, capitalists 
could move their investments to different places where they can invest more freely. 
The key point here is that ‘business confidence’ reflects the short-term interests of 
the capitalists and the influence of their interests on the actions of state managers.  
As a result, even when there is no direct pressure from capitalists, the state actors 
need to maintain a degree of business confidence to maintain their own social power 
and the state apparatus.  
Yet one question remains: The state actions and policies that attempt to 
maintain and increase business confidence often require an increase in the role of the 
state in the economy. Why would capitalists give more power to state managers? This 
is a result of our second major structural mechanism that determines the actions of 
state managers, class struggle.  
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Class struggle broadly has two main effects in determining capitalist 
development and political-economic relations. First, through the struggle for higher 
wages, class struggle pushes capitalists to develop the forces of production to replace 
workers with machines and make production more ‘efficient’. Second, through the 
struggle for improving living and working conditions often requires the state to act.  
In the struggles to improve working and living conditions, the working class has 
played an important role in the increased role of the state in capitalist countries. 
These struggles pressured the state into imposing more regulations and providing 
more services for working class people. Yet capitalists have also supported increased 
state regulation, if not state spending, in cases where it would hurt their competitors 
or to get government contracts. But the major factor in the growth of state 
intervention in the economy has been working class struggle and the pursuit of state 
managers to gain more power.  
This is where we encounter the development of public education. Block states 
that “workers have played an important role, for example, in demanding increased 
public education” (Block 1987: 64) A glimpse at the history of public education in the 
United States reveals that periods of its development and spread coincide with 
periods of high levels of class struggle in the 1930s and 1960s. Within these periods 
strikes and social movements were widespread. The expansion of public education, in 
return, helped create an educated labor force that capitalist development required 
but without class struggle the conditions under which public education expanded 
would be undoubtably different.  
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Although working class struggles can lead to an increase in state regulation 
and services, we must not lose sight of the constraints under which the state 
apparatus functions. Block states that; “working-class pressures, for example, might 
lead to an expansion on educational resources available for the working class, but 
there is every likelihood that the content of the education will be geared to the needs 
of accumulation - the production of a docile workforce at an appropriate level of skill” 
(Ibid). Oftentimes, after a working-class victory in one of these struggles, the 
capitalist class will attempt to neutralize or destroy the gains through its influence 
on the state apparatus, or the state managers might have to undo certain regulations 
or cut spending during times of crisis. We have seen these types of policies take place 
under neoliberal hegemony. Block states three main factors that state managers 
must weigh at the times of popular struggles. First, the state managers do not want 
to hurt business confidence. Second, they do not want to escalate class conflicts to a 
level that would threaten their own rule. And third, they are aware that the expanded 
role of the state will also grow their own power and resources.  
To summarize this section, we have established that the capitalist class lacks 
the class consciousness to influence the state in a unified manner and that there is a 
division of labor between the capitalist class and its representatives in the state. Yet, 
the state still acts in the interests of the capitalist class due to direct coercion, 
capitalist cultural hegemony and its dependence on the level of investment capitalists 
provide. We have also established that class struggle determines the actions and the 
development of the state apparatus, but these remain within the confines of ; (1) 
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maintaining “business confidence”, (2) the state managers’ interest in increasing 
their own power and resources, and (3) lowering the level of class antagonisms to 
maintain political stability. In relation to public education, we have stated that its 
growth had been influenced by class struggle but also within the confines of the 
capitalist interests and the interests of the state actors. Next sections will analyze 
the economics the Great Recession, the state reaction against it, provide empirical 
evidence to support some of the theses from this section and look at labor relations in 
public education,. 
The Crisis 
There is evidence of teachers’ salaries eroding at least since the late 
1960s.(Allegretto, Corcoran, and Mishel 2008) Although the current crisis of public 
education is mostly a result of the Great Recession and the policies that followed it, 
similar trends can be observed during past recessions as well. Therefore, to 
understand these policies, we should have a more in depth look at what dynamics 
caused the Great Recession and economic crises in general. 
There are many theories that attempt to explain the dynamics of the Great 
Recession. The most mainstream theories tend to assume that capitalism is capable 
of continuously creating economic growth. Hence, most recessions are either 
explained by shocks that are ‘exogeneous’ to the system, or by business cycle 
‘adjustments’ (Shaikh 1978).  More ‘heterodox’ theories emphasize the growth of the 
financial sector and instability created by increased financialization. (Minsky 1992, 
Stiglitz 2015). However, in economics rarely are recessions considered in the context 
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of the long-term development of capitalism. This, in turn, often leads to misleading 
conclusions about what happened and what is to be done next.  
In the First Great Depression of the 21st century, Anwar Shaikh tries to explain 
the causes of the Great Recession with the long-term movements in the profit rate of 
enterprise. The profit rate of enterprise, in Shaikh’s essay, refers to the difference 
between the rate of profit and the interest rate. Shaikh explains the enterprise rate 
of profit in the following way:   
The classical economists argued that it is the difference between the 
profit rate (r) and the interest rate (i) which is central to accumulation. 
The reason is that profit is the return to active investment, while the 
interest rate is the return to passive investment. A given amount of 
capital may be invested in producing or selling commodities, in lending 
money, or in active speculation. The rate of profit in each case is its 
return, fraught with all the risks, uncertainties and errors to which such 
endeavors are subject. … On the other hand, the same amount of capital 
could just as well be invested in a savings account or a safe bond, earning 
interest in quiet and relative safety. The interest rate is the benchmark, 
the safe alternative, to the rate of return on active investment. (Shaikh 
2011) 
 
Through observing the movements in this rate, Shaikh also elaborates how a similar 
trend to the Great Recession played out in the great stagflation crisis of the 1970s. In 
Figure 1, Shaikh displays the changes in the rate of profit before interest. 
<Figure 1> 
 
As we can see the rate of profit before interest started declining in mid-1960s 
but stabilized after the 1970s. Shaikh explains this stabilization through two factors. 
The first factor is an increase in exploitation. This means that workers became more 
productive but this increase in their productivity was not reflected on their income. 
Figure 2 shows the growing gap between income and productivity starting in 1982. 
13 
 
In the case of teachers, this change will be reflected in a slow decline in pupil per 
teacher ratio combined with a much sharper decline in teacher incomes as we will see 
in the next section.   
<Figure 2> 
 
In Figure 2, Shaikh shows that if the relationship between real wages and 
productivity continued at the same pace as the pre-1982 period, the gap between 
wages and productivity would have been much lower. Shaikh credits the post-1982 
trend on concerted attacks on labor in this period by capitalists and claims that this 
has helped the profit rate recover. In Figure 3, we can see the existing and 
counterfactual trends in the profit rate for if the wages had kept up with the increases 
in productivity.  
<Figure 3> 
 
As we can see, the capitalist attacks on labor helped the rate of profit stabilize 
to some extent since the 1980s. The second factor that stabilized profitability was the 
interest rate. Since profit rate of enterprise is defined to be the difference between 
the profit rate and the interest rate, the changes in interest rate influences 
investment decisions significantly. Figure 4 shows the long-term trends in the 
interest rate.  
<Figure 4>  
 
From 1947 to 1981, the interest rate increased from 0.59% to 14.03%. After 
1981, it had dropped just as drastically to 0.16% in 2009. Figure 5 shows the combined 
effects of the drop of the interest rate and the increase in exploitation. These two 
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factors help explain the recovery from the stagflation crisis and the long boom that 
lasted until the 2009 crisis.  
<Figure 5> 
 
As we can see in Figure 5, the profit rate of enterprise recovered from 1982 
until 2009, although still having two downturns which coincide with the two 
recessions that happened in the late 1980s and early 2000s. Shaikh’s theory also 
explains why the boom that took place since 1982 was inherently contradictory. As 
work became more exploitative and interest rates went down, household debts 
increased significantly. Figure 6 shows the increase in debt to income ratio for the 
given period. 
<Figure 6> 
 
As household debt soared and wages stagnated, people could no longer pay 
back their debt, and this has led to a drop in the rate of profit of enterprise and 
triggered the Great Recession. The main takeaway from this section is the 
relationship between the previously mentioned “business confidence”, the rate of 
profit and its effects on working-class people when the level of class struggle is low. 
As the rate of profit declined in the 1970s, state actors and capitalists alike were 
forced to act to recover profitability. They did this through concerted attacks on labor, 
deunionization and changes in the labor law. Figures 7 and 8 show the sharp decline 
in rates of union membership and ratio of workers represented by unions since the 
1980s. 
<Figure 7> 
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<Figure 8> 
 
One policy Shaikh does not mention is the complete reconstruction of the US 
tax code and the rhetoric of taxation in the 1980s. In 1981, US top individual income 
tax rates dropped from 70% to 50%. By the end of the 1980s this rate dropped to 33% 
(Frankel 2017c). For our purposes, as it will be discussed in the next section, federal 
income taxes are not the most relevant factor in public education, but it is important 
to understand the shift in tax policies, their impact on what constitutes a ‘legitimate 
policy’, and how states followed suit with the federal government which led to similar 
consequences at the times of crisis. Tax cuts have been one of the main policies the 
state actors used to promote ‘business confidence’ in the last few decades. As a result 
of this, federal corporate income tax rates have also been lowered in the last few 
decades as Figure 9 shows (Trading Economics 2020a). As the federal government 
has been cutting taxes consistently, public debt has soared and became a large 
justification for austerity. Figure 10 shows the increase in US government debt since 
the 1950s (Trading Economics 2020b).  
<Figure 9> 
<Figure 10> 
The next section will discuss the general state of public education in the United 
States and what has led to the current crisis will be explained in the context of 
concepts explored. The final section will look at the crisis from the point of view of the 
teachers and their relationship to the public education system.  
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The State of Public Education 
It is quite easy to paint various pictures about the state of public education in 
the US based on available data. For example, we can see in Figure 11 that the United 
States is among the countries that have the highest per pupil spending on education 
(OECD 2019). Or we could observe in Figure 12 that the per pupil spending in the 
United States had been increasing consistently for most of the last century (NEA 
2016). 
<Figure 11> 
<Figure 12> 
These overall figures mystify the large disparities that exist in public 
education in the United States. A closer look at per pupil spending across states 
reveals an entirely different picture. In Figure 13, we can see the various trends 
displayed by all the states (Ibid). While all states display an increase in per pupil 
spending over the last 50 years, the degrees by which per pupil spending has 
increased vary largely across states. Some states have much lower per-pupil spending 
levels than others. We can also see periodic declines and stagnations at the level of 
public spending, including one such period since the Great Recession. The main 
reason for this is the way education is funded in the United States. Unlike many other 
countries, in the United States, majority of the funding for public schools come from 
the state and local taxes. Figure 14 shows how US public schools have been funded 
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since 2000 (NCES 2020).  A more in depth look at how each state funds their public 
schools could be found in Figure 15 (Ibid). 
<Figure 14> 
<Figure 15> 
 
The overreliance on local and state spending in public education leads to 
extreme disparities both across and within states. A study by Bruce D. Baker, Mark 
Weber, Ajay Srikanth, Robert Kim and Michael Atzbi includes the following map 
which displays the disparities that exist in education spending in the United States 
(Baker et al. 2018). The map displays the states that are below the required funding 
levels to reach average national education outcomes in red and those that are above 
in green. We can observe that the states in the southeast and the southwest are 
significantly below the required funding levels reach national averages in education 
outcomes. 
<Map 1> 
To understand these disparities and relate it to the current crisis, we need to have a 
closer look at state and local government spending and revenues. A study by the 
Urban Institute shows how state and local government revenues have been used 
nationally over time (Urban Institute 2015). We can see in Figure 16 that spending 
on public education from local and state governments have been declining while 
spending on public welfare has been increasing at least since the Great Recession. 
This is partly because of the drastic increases in healthcare costs in the United States 
as well as the increased dependency on welfare since the Great Recession as the 
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employment rates declined. In Figure 17, we can see that in 2015 only 0.5% of state 
spending went to K-12 schools while 40% of local government spending went to K-12 
schools. 
<Figure 16> 
<Figure 17> 
As we have mentioned in the previous section, the Great Recession was a result of 
the decline in profitability. As profitability declined, state revenues also declined due 
to lower investments, lower incomes, and lower levels of employment. As of 2017, 16 
states are still below the amount of tax revenues they reported prior to the recession 
(Rosewicz and Newman 2018). Figure 18 shows the tax revenues of states in 
comparison to their revenues prior to the recession.  
<Figure 18> 
While tax revenues stagnated or declined, healthcare costs were increasing. 
Because of this and lower levels of employment, more and more people became 
dependent on Medicaid. Medicaid and CHIP enrollment have increased nationally 
from 56,533,472 people in 2013 to 73,910,380 in 2018.(Bloom 2017) This was a result 
of the average health expenses increasing from $7,700 per year in 2007 to $10,345 in 
2016. As a result, the amount of state money left to spend on education declined. 
Figure 19 shows the sharp drop in per pupil state education spending (Leachman, 
Masterson, and Figueroa 2017a). Figure 20 shows state by state declines in per pupil 
funding. As we can see Arizona, Oklahoma and Kentucky are among the states whose 
19 
 
per pupil spending have declined while West Virginia’s per pupil spending only 
increased by 3.6% between 2008 and 2015. 
<Figure 19> 
<Figure 20> 
Lower state revenues and higher state costs have pushed state managers to 
lower in teachers’ salaries and benefits. According to estimates by the National 
Education Association, adjusted for inflation, average teacher salaries in the United 
States have declined from $60,778 in 2003 to $58,950 in 2016.(Chang 2018) For the 
states that have lost large sums of state funding the teacher salaries remain 
significantly lower than the national average. In Oklahoma teacher salaries went 
from $45,579 in 2003 to $45,245 in 2016, while in West Virginia they went from 
$49,999 to $45,701. Teachers in Arizona saw one of the largest drops from $54,396 to 
$47,403. As of 2015, teachers make 23% less than other college graduates (Allegretto 
and Mishel 2016). The wage gap between public teachers and similar workers grew 
from 5.5% in 1979 to 17% in 2015. If we adjust for teachers’ compensation through 
benefits, this gap remains at 11%. In no state teachers make more than other college 
graduates. Table 1 shows the ratio of teacher salaries to other college graduate 
salaries state by state.  
<Table 1> 
So far, we have shown that because of the drop in the rate of profit there have 
been lower levels of investments. The lower levels of investments made state budgets 
shrink significantly. Because of this, states cut their spending in K-12 public 
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education. This led to a decline in per pupil spending and sped up the decline that 
was already taking place in teachers’ salaries. As we can see, under the cases of 
external economic pressure, state actors are forced, and do not hesitate to remove 
what are essential services for working class people. But some states went even 
further. To recover profitability in their states, 7 of the 12 states with the most 
significant drops in K-12 spending have also lowered their individual or corporate tax 
rates.(Leachman et al. 2017a) North Carolina reduced their top marginal individual 
tax rate by 1.95%, while teachers’ salaries declined from $56,174 in 2003 to $49,837 
in 2016 and as their per pupil state spending declined by 12.2% between 2008 and 
2018. Kansas reduced theirs by 1.65% (Tax Foundation.org 2013), while teachers’ 
salaries declined by $4,272 between 2009 and 2016. Figure 21 shows the states that 
have also cut taxes while their schools were already receiving less funding then 
before.(Leachman et al. 2017a)  
<Figure 21> 
The goal of this section has been to provide empirical evidence for the state 
actions that have led to decreasing public education quality and teachers’ salaries. 
Since the recession, most states have lower spending dedicated to public schools. This 
was a result of state actors’ decision to cut public spending – and in some states even 
cut taxes, to recover profitability in their states. Cuts in public spending and taxes 
became standard tactics among policy makers since the 1980s, and the policies that 
have followed the Great Recession have only been a new wave of this trend. As a 
result, jobs in education have declined by 135,000 and capital spending in K-12 public 
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schools are more than 25% lower than their 2008 levels, while student enrollment 
increased by 1,419,000 between 2008 and 2017 (Ibid). In short, the rate of exploitation 
increased significantly in public schools as teachers had to educate a larger number 
of students with a smaller quantity of resources. In the next section, we will explore 
the process of radicalization among teachers in the face of these circumstances.  
Teacher Revolts: Then and Now 
 Although it might be surprising based on what we discussed so far, throughout 
the early twentieth century teaching was considered a ‘profession’, almost on par with 
law and medicine in terms of its social status (Cole 1969). For this reason, the 
organizations of teachers like the National Education Association and the American 
Federation of Teachers modeled themselves after the likes of the American Bar 
Association and American Medical Association. NEA opposed the unionization of 
teachers, and both NEA and AFT had no-strike policies until the 1960s as they 
believed this would degrade the teaching profession. Hence the earlier waves of 
unionization and protests among teachers were driven largely by the attempts to 
maintain or expand the professional integrity of the profession. Because of this 
millions of teachers, most of whom taught in public schools, were excluded from the 
collective bargaining provisions of NLRA alongside the rest of the public sector 
workers as teachers largely sat out the strike waves of the 1930s (Shelton 2017:6).  
Until the late-1950s-early-1960s, there was little strike activity among 
teachers with the exception of a handful of communist led locals during the Great 
Depression(Ibid:11-12), and a few AFL-Locals in mid-1940s before Taft-Hartley as 
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teacher wages declined in the face of post-war inflation (Cole 1969: 14). Up to this 
point, American Federation of Teachers was largely left alone by the national AFL 
leadership, as the AFT was perceived to be more of a professional association. 
Meanwhile the NEA maintained its commitment to opposing strikes while it 
remained the largest teacher’s union in the country. However, a wave of strikes that 
began with the New York night schoolteachers strike in 1959 pushed for collective 
bargaining rights among public school teachers and helped change the no-strike 
stance of prominent teacher unions. As these strikes spread and began winning 
collective bargaining rights, and as AFL membership declined in the late 1950s as 
the number of factory workers declined due to automation (Ibid: 165), the AFL 
leadership began to view organizing teachers as a way of increasing union 
membership among the largely non-union white collar labor force. Hence, the AFL 
began to aid these efforts among teachers which also challenged the NEA’s no strike 
position. However, during this period, most state school boards used a ‘carrot-and-
stick’ approach where the legal recognition of collective bargaining rights came 
alongside no-strike laws (Shelton 7). 
Even as it was illegal for most public-school teachers to go on strike, another 
wave of strikes emerged in the middle of the 1972-75 in reaction the ‘budget crisis’ 
created by the stagflation crisis. After the crisis,  
The decimated tax base, continued loss of jobs, and 
movement of wealth to the suburbs combined with 
economic downturn and the higher salaries of city teachers 
in the collective bargaining era to create massive budget 
shortfalls. During the late 1960s, banking interests had 
been willing to cover deficits with credit, but in the 1970s 
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they increasingly moved to discipline cities with austerity 
budgets that hurt both public employees and the urban 
citizens who both relied on those services and had been 
critical of the subpar versions that had existed before fiscal 
crisis. (Ibid: 12) 
 
Both the fiscal crisis of the 1970s and that of 2010s were caused by the same dynamic 
of declining profitability and ‘business confidence’ which lowered tax revenues in 
certain localities. Similarly, in both cases the economic burden of the budget shortfall 
was shifted onto the shoulders of public sector employees by their state managers, 
rather than the capitalists. The main difference between the two waves of strikes is 
that the strikes began in the newly unionized urban school districts in the 1970s 
which were hit the hardest due to the racialized nature of the budget cuts, but they 
started in more rural southern states in the strike wave that began in 2018 (although 
as I mentioned in the introduction, the strikes did eventually move to large urban 
areas within the span of a few months).  
 The teachers’ demands in the mid-1970s strike wave were concerned with 
inflation wage-adjustments, layoffs, and class sizes. In Philadelphia, where the wave 
started in 1972: 
 The board of education’s contract offer in August 1972 
seemed certain to provoke a strike. In addition to freezing 
salaries, the proposal extended the teaching day and 
eliminated over 500 jobs. Not only did teachers oppose the 
cuts, but they also asked for enough new positions to 
reduce class sizes and a 34 percent salary increase for all 
teachers to offset the 7 percent inflation since the last 
contract and the expectation of higher inflation when 
Nixon lifted price controls. (Ibid: 84) 
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In January 1973, after the second strike of Philadelphia teachers since August 1972, 
Chicago teachers went on strike. “The CTU initially demanded a 10 percent pay 
increase but quickly scaled it down to 2.5 percent; the salary increase was not as 
important as averting the layoffs and larger class sizes” (Ibid 101). In St. Louis,  
… by 1972, a skilled union craftsman without a high school 
education working for the school district began with an 
annual salary that was $3,000 higher than a first-year 
teacher. Teachers believed that their level of education and 
social status entitled them to be paid on par with or better 
than blue-collar workers. Without exclusive 
representation, two unions competed for the city’s 
teachers—the slightly larger STLTU (Local 420) and the 
St. Louis Teachers Association (SLTA–NEA). (Ibid: 105)  
 
Around the same time as the Chicago strike “the two sides joined forces, threatening 
a strike the next January unless the school board agreed to a collective-bargaining 
election, hospitalization insurance, and a “substantial” midyear raise” (Ibid). Out of 
these strikes, only St. Louis teachers did not have the legal recognition for collective 
bargaining, however, the strikes would eventually spread to Detroit and New York 
where the teachers also did not have the legal right to strike. 
By the 2010s the working conditions and the quality of educational resources 
had deteriorated to obscene levels in parts of the country as we described in the 
previous section. Alongside wage demands, the teachers had to fight for additional 
funding for the needs of their students. “Between 2008 and 2017, per-pupil 
instructional funding was cut by 28 percent in Oklahoma and 14 percent in Arizona, 
ranking them as the forty-sixth and forty-ninth lowest-funded states in 2017” (Blanc 
2019) In spring 2018,  
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Due to budget cuts, many districts in Arizona and 
Oklahoma have been forced to reduce the school week to 
four days... Class sizes are often enormous, while textbooks 
are scarce and scandalously out of date. Innumerable arts, 
language, and sports programs have been eliminated. 
Broken desks, crumbling ceilings, chair shortages, and 
rodent infestations have become normal. (Ibid) 
 
Because of this funding demands for students were as central for striking teachers in 
Oklahoma and Arizona as wage demands. Similarly, for West Virginia teachers, 
salary demands were also secondary as “the movement arose primarily in response 
to proposed changes to the state’s public health insurance plan, the Public Employees 
Insurance Agency (PEIA)” (Ibid). As we mentioned in the last section, in the last 
decade the rising health care expenses became a major part cost on states, hence also 
a major target for austerity budgets.  As the strikes moved to blue states, the 
demands included assistance for homeless students in Chicago (Maass 2019), and 
“ending punitive disciplinary procedures that feed the “school to prison pipeline” and 
do nothing to improve school climate, essential for safe schools” in LA  (Weiner 2019). 
 It is important to note that the strikes in West Virginia, Oklahoma and Arizona 
were all illegal. Although the initial wave of strikes in the 1960s, before the teachers 
gained collective bargaining rights were illegal as well, these strikes took place in a 
completely different atmosphere where strikes and union activity were widespread 
across the country (Shierholz and Poydock 2020). On the other hand, when West 
Virginia teachers went on strike in April 2018, the South had been marked by the 
weakness of organized labor and the labor movement had been on retreat for decades. 
As Eric Blanc puts it: 
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To the surprise of all, this frontal challenge to austerity 
and neoliberalism came in the form of illegal statewide 
strikes in Republican “right to work” bastions. Since unions 
in these states were relatively weak and collective 
bargaining virtually nonexistent, the strikes took on an 
unusually volcanic and unruly form. In an unprecedented 
historical development, much of the organizing for these 
actions took place in secret Facebook groups where 
teachers could share their fears, hopes, personal stories, 
and action proposals (as well as countless silly memes). 
And with union officials reluctant to call for illegal mass 
action, rank and filers stepped into the leadership vacuum 
and filled it to the best of their abilities. (Ibid) 
 
The uniqueness of the ‘Red State Revolt’ was not limited to this. The bottom-up model 
of organizing, largely driven by the rank and file created a more democratic 
environment where the rank and file could bypass the hesitant union leadership 
through the strong social bonds that existed between them. As Blanc states; 
Organizers and rank and filers endlessly insisted that it 
was only by coming together across their myriad of divides 
that school employees could achieve their demands. The 
names of the Facebook organizing groups that launched 
the walkouts are indicative: West Virginia Public 
Employees United, Oklahoma Teachers United (OTU), and 
Arizona Educators United (AEU). In West Virginia, the 
page quickly became known simply as United. This 
consistent emphasis reflects a basic fact about labor 
struggles under capitalism: namely, that as atomized 
individuals, workers are virtually powerless at work. Only 
by joining together with our coworkers in common 
organizations and actions are we able to assert ourselves 
against management. 
 
 As these strikes were largely successful in winning many of their demands, 
they also prove Block’s point about state’s behavior.  The important lesson from both 
the case of the 1960s-70s and the current wave of teacher strikes is that the state is 
structurally inclined to pursue the interests of the capitalists by pursuing austerity 
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in the times of crisis in order to recover ‘business confidence’. In both cases, however, 
the active resistance of the working class is the only way to stop the imposition of 
austerity, and to better the conditions of the working-class. Throughout the neoliberal 
era, public sector unions have been hesitant to go on strike as the tides turned against 
them both legally and politically (Shelton 2017:192-93). However, the successes of the 
striking teachers in 2018-19 could mark a turning as more workers organize for power 
from the bottom up and counter the structural tendencies of capitalism and the state.
 A democratic workers movement still carries the most promising alternative 
to politics of neoliberal austerity.  
Conclusions 
Unless we follow the example of striking teachers, the states will continue to 
starve public schools and teachers and as a result the quality of education will 
continue to decline. This paper discussed the decline in public schools through 
explaining their relation to the state and the capitalist system. The first section has 
focused on theories of the state and elaborated the political and economic constraints 
under which state managers act. The second section explained the concept of 
profitability and the neoliberal policies the state actors followed to recover 
profitability after the stagflation crisis of the 1970s. The third section explained the 
effects of falling profitability and investments on state budgets and empirically 
showed the cuts in state funding for public education that were caused by these 
factors. It has also shown that the low-tax and low-spending neoliberal orthodoxy 
that was established following the stagflation crisis continued to influence policies in 
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some of the states with largest cuts in public education. The final section briefly 
discussed the history of public sector teacher strikes during the stagflation crisis and 
since the Great Recession. To conclude I argue that unless class struggle in public 
education continues to surge, we can expect to see the continuation of similar policies 
as profitability continues to decline and state actors continue to pursue neoliberal 
policies. 
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Figures and Charts 
Figure 1: Actual and Trend Rate of Profit, US Nonfinancial Corporations 1947-2010 
Profit = Earnings Before Interest and Tax 
 
Source: Shaikh(2011) 
 
Figure 2: Hourly Real Wages and Productivity, US Business Sector 1947-2010(1992 
= 100)  
 
Source:Shaikh(2011) 
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Figure 3: Actual and Counterfactual Rate of Profit of US Nonfinancial Corporations 
1947-2009(Counterfactual path if real wages had continued on their postwar trend)
 
Source:Shaikh(2011) 
 
Figure 4: The Rate of Interest (3 Mo. T-Bill), US 1947-2008
 
Source:Shaikh(2011) 
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Figure 5: Rate of Profit-of-Enterprise: US Nonfinancial Corporations, 1947-2008
 
Source: Shaikh(2011) 
 
Figure 6: Household Debt-to-Income Ratio 
 
Source: Shaikh(2011) 
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Figure 7: Percent of employed, Members of unions 
 
Source: BLS 
Figure 8: Percent of employed, Represented by unions 
 
Source:BLS 
 
Figure 9:US Federal Corporate Tax Rate 
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Figure 10: US Government Debt 
 
Figure 11: Primary to Post Secondary per pupil spending 
 
Source:OECD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 
 
Figure 13
 
Source: National Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 2016 
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Figure 14 
 
Source: NCES 
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Source: National Education Association 
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Map1: Current spending as % of cost of achieving national average outcomes 
 
Source: Baker et al(2015) 
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Figure 19 
 
Figure 20 
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Table 1 
State Ratio State Ratio State Ratio State Ratio State Ratio 
AZ 62.83% AL 71.79% US 77.02% OH 79.74% MD 83.58% 
CO 64.54% TX 72.80% ID 77.33% IA 80.00% DE 83.68% 
NC 65.38% WA 73.52% OR 77.91% LA 80.54% CA 85.79% 
NM 66.16% KS 73.87% NH 78.53% NE 80.85% NJ 86.51% 
VA 66.87% WV 74.62% KY 78.76% MA 81.61% VT 86.59% 
OK 66.98% FL 74.64% IL 78.97% CT 82.05% PA 87.05% 
MO 67.81% AR 74.81% SC 79.16% MN 82.29% ND 88.18% 
GA 69.25% MS 74.84% DC 79.20% IN 82.45% NY 91.26% 
UT 70.31% HI 76.36% NV 79.37% WI 82.55% MT 91.66% 
TN 70.69% SD 76.38% ME 79.72% MI 82.69% AK 93.84% 
        
RI 95.77% 
        
WY 98.62% 
Source: Allegreto and Mishel 2016 
Figure 21 
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